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Microsoft and Trinko: A Tale of Two Courts
Spencer Weber Waller*
Two recent opinions have sought to systematize and rationalize the law of
monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act ("Section 2").1 Those cases
are United States v. Microsoft Corp.2 and Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. (Trinko). 3 They are the most recent word of the
D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court respectively about the core meaning of one of
the two basic prohibitions contained in the United States' antitrust laws. In this
brief comment, I will use the debate over the enduring meaning of Microsoft to
argue that the D.C. Circuit has surpassed the United States Supreme Court as the
most important and articulate antitrust court and has outshone the highest court in
the land in crafting honest and true antitrust doctrine consistent with history,
precedent, and policy.
Professors Gavil and First are to be commended for their searching inquiry into
the ongoing fight over the meaning and legacy of the antitrust litigation against
Microsoft, both here and abroad.4 They are right in arguing that the combined
effect of the appellate decision on the merits of the case, the subsequent consent
decree, and the response of the Bush Administration to foreign enforcement
actions has done little to restore competition and done much to protect Microsoft's
durable market power from future challenge.
While Gavil and First are correct in noting the role of the D.C. Circuit in the
piecemeal analysis of the various anticompetitive actions by Microsoft, 5 there is
still much to admire in the craftsmanship of the opinion. The Microsoft decision of
the D.C. Circuit should stand as a landmark in the history of antitrust law. It is a
thoughtful, scholarly opinion by a court that values and respects the antitrust laws.
This opinion largely succeeded at systematizing and rationalizing a body of law
under Section 2, which was often the subject of empty slogans and little analytical
heft.6
In contrast is Trinko. Sometimes there is an opinion that it so profoundly
*Associate Dean for Faculty Research, Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies,
and
Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. With thanks and gratitude to John Flynn who
always kept us focused on what really mattered and how to get there. I appreciate the thoughtful
comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript by Brett Frischmann, John Bronsteen, Larry Solan, and
Christopher Leslie.
'15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
2253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

3540 U.S. 398 (2004).
4Harry First & Andrew I. Gavil, Re-Framing Windows: The Durable Meaning of the
Microsoft
Antitrust Litigation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 641,684-87, 697-721.
5
1d. at 680-84.
6See William L. Reynolds & Spencer Weber Waller, Legal Processand the PastofAntitrust,
48 SMU L. REv. 1811, 1823-27 (1995) (discussing the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section
2).
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wrong that Mary McCarthy's famous quote about Lillian Hellman comes to mind:
"[E]very word she writes is a lie, including and and the."7 Trinko is such an
opinion. It is not a lie, of course, because the majority of the Supreme Court
presumably believes it to be true and intends it as a binding statement of the law.
However, the Trinko opinion is not true in any normal sense either. Justice
Scalia's opinion is wrong on the law, wrong on the facts, wrong as a matter of
procedure, wrong as a matter of economics, wrong as a matter of institutional
competencies, and a poor contrast with the way Section 2 legal standards have8
been articulated by courts in antitrust cases since the passage of the Sherman Act.
It is also a stunning contrast to the careful, thoughtful, and systematic way the D.C.
Circuit analyzed these same principles in Microsoft.
In this comment, I compare the Microsoft and Trinko opinions as to the core
issues addressed in Section 2 of the Sherman Act: monopoly power and
exclusionary conduct. While Professors Gavil and First focus on Microsoft's faults,
I tend to emphasize its strengths as a well-crafted opinion trying to synthesize
complicated areas of the law in a creative but straightforward and intellectually
honest manner. Microsoft compares well to Trinko's recklessness and less
straightforward attempts to move the law in a dramatic fashion without
acknowledging what it is seeking to do. I then rely on the insights of the Legal
Process School to evaluate the merits of both opinions and to reach some very
tentative conclusions about how and why the Microsoft opinion is more likely to be
viewed and trusted as the definitive word as to the meaning of monopolization
under the Sherman Act. While Trinko is profoundly troubling and may be the latest
word on this subject, fortunately it is not the final word.
I. MICROSOFT ON MONOPOLY

The key sections of the 2001 Microsoft decision of the D.C. Circuit speak for
themselves. As to the existence of monopoly power, a necessary but not sufficient
finding for imposing liability under Section 2, the court noted:
While merely possessing monopoly power is not itself an antitrust
violation, it is a necessary element of a monopolization charge. The
Supreme Court defines monopoly power as "the power to control prices
7

Dick Cavett Show: Interview with Mary McCarthy (PBS television broadcast Oct. 18, 1979)
(speaking about Lillian Hellman), quoted in Anne Applebaum, Fashionsin Falsehood,WASH. POST,
Feb. 2, 2006, at A21.
8
The Trinko court is correct in noting that the text of Section 2 does not include theories of
leveraging which would impose liability if a defendant used power in one market to some advantage
falling short of monopolization or attempted monopolization in a related market. 540 U.S. at 415
n.4. Other jurisdictions have done a better job at addressing this issue under their laws dealing with
an abuse of a dominant theory which textually can encompass theories of leveraging if adequately
proved. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 82, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C
340) 3.
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or exclude competition." More precisely, a firm is a monopolist if it can
profitably raise prices substantially above the competitive level. Where
evidence indicates that a firm has in fact profitably done so, the
existence of monopoly power is clear. Because such direct proof is only
rarely available, courts more typically examine market structure in
search of circumstantial evidence of monopoly power. Under this
structural approach, monopoly power may be inferred from a firm's
possession of a dominant share of a relevant market that is protected by
entry barriers. "Entry barriers" are factors (such as certain regulatory
requirements) that prevent new rivals from timely responding to an
increase in price above the competitive level. 9
As to the type of conduct that a monopolist must engage in to violate Section
2, the court established a series of shifting burdens of proof:
From a century of case law on monopolization under § 2, however,
several principles do emerge. First, to be condemned as exclusionary, a
monopolist's act must have an "anticompetitive effect." That is, it must
harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers. In contrast,
harm to one or more competitors will not suffice. "The [Sherman Act]
directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so,
but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself."
Second, the plaintiff, on whom the burden of proof of course rests,
must demonstrate that the monopolist's conduct indeed has the requisite
anticompetitive effect. In a case brought by a private plaintiff, the
plaintiff must show that its injury is "of 'the type that the statute was
intended to forestall,"'; no less in a case brought by the Government, it
must demonstrate that the monopolist's conduct harmed competition, not
just a competitor.
Third, if a plaintiff successfully establishes aprimafaciecase under
§ 2 by demonstrating anticompetitive effect, then the monopolist may
proffer a "procompetitive justification" for its conduct. If the monopolist
asserts a procompetitive justification-a nonpretextual claim that its
conduct is indeed a form of competition on the merits because it
involves, for example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer
appeal-then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut that claim.
Fourth, if the monopolist's procompetitive justification stands
unrebutted, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive
harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit. In cases
arising under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the courts routinely apply a similar
balancing approach under the rubric of the "rule of reason." The source
of the rule of reason is Standard Oil Co. v. United States, in which the
9

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
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Supreme Court used that term to describe the proper inquiry under both
sections of the Act ....
Finally, in considering whether the monopolist's conduct on
balance harms competition and is therefore condemned as exclusionary
for purposes of § 2, our focus is upon the effect of that conduct, not
upon the intent behind it. Evidence of the intent behind the conduct of a
monopolist is relevant only to the extent it helps us understand the likely
effect of the monopolist's conduct. 10
Although I have omitted the relevant citations, the Microsoft decision is
respectful of history and precedent, and attempts to set out enduring standards that
one could intelligently apply regardless of what side one represented in a particular
dispute. Microsoft is making law, but in a way that is hard to tell in advance which
side will prevail in its application to any particular fact pattern. Indeed, if the
reader stopped at this point in the decision, there would be no way to tell whether
Microsoft or the government would win as to any given point of contention.I In
the real world, Microsoft lost on most Section 2 issues under this test because the
government was able to demonstrate anticompetitive harm for most of the
defendant's practices and Microsoft could not offer persuasive non-pretextual
12
procompetitive justifications, thus failing the third prong of the court's test.
'1.

THE TROUBLE WITH TRINKO

13

Whenever I teach Trinko in my basic antitrust class, the students invariably
view it as a narrow and peculiar case about the intersection between antitrust and a
highly technical form of regulation prescribed in the 1996 Telecommunications
Act.14 They wonder what the big deal is or why I make such a big deal out of a
short, highly fact-specific case. The students are half right. Trinko should have

0

d. at 58-59 (citations omitted).
"Although beyond the scope of this comment, I would go so far as to argue that the decision
can be read as consistent with the theory ofjustice associated with the philosopher John Rawls, who
argued that justice requires the selection of rules behind a veil of ignorance in which the decision
maker does not know in advance whether the selected rule helps them or hurts them in the real
world. 2JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971).
1 See, e.g., Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 63-64 (finding no justification for certain restrictions in
OEM license agreements); id. at 66-67 (finding no justification for commingling certain computer

code and excluding Internet Explorer from Add/Remove utility program); id. at 71 (finding no
justification for exclusive licenses with Internet Application Programmers). Where Microsoft met
that burden, the court did not impose liability unless the plaintiff was able to demonstrate that
anticompetitive harm outweighed procompetitive justification. Id. at 67 (finding no liability for

overriding
user's choice of browser when necessary technically).
' 3With thanks to Eleanor Fox who first coined this alliterative title in a presentation to the
American Bar Association. Eleanor M. Fox, The Trouble with Trinko, 2004 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST
I.
14See source cited infra note 31.
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been that type of an opinion, and perhaps it might be if one ignores all the dicta.
However, the problem with Trinko is that it offers unfounded and plainly wrong
general statements about antitrust law, the operation of markets in the real world,
monopoly power, and regulation that supports a political agenda that is being
waged in antitrust. This agenda is being played out in the Bush Administration's
continuing treatment of the Microsoft case, joint Antitrust Division/FTC hearings
on the scope of Section 2 and before the Congressionally mandated Antitrust
Modernization Commission.15 As a result, Trinko matters. Here are some of the
reasons that I tell my students why it matters, how truly radical it appears to be,
and how badly it compares to Microsoft.
A. ProceduralTone Deafness
The Trinko majority failed to consider the procedural context of the case that
has been critical to the major antitrust cases of the recent past. This failure is oddly
inconsistent with the Court's recent treatment in general of the standards for
deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
The procedural posture of the case has been critical to most of the important
antitrust decisions of the past twenty years. In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., the case came to the Court following a full trial on the
merits. 16 Having conceded the issue of monopoly power and the definition of the
relevant market, the defendants nonetheless argued that there was no support for
the jury's verdict that they had engaged in unlawful monopolization.17 The Court
rejected this argument, holding the evidence introduced by the plaintiff of harm to
consumers and competition, a dramatic change in a longstanding course of dealing,
the defendant's lack of business justification, and its willingness to sacrifice
18
revenues to injure a rival were more than sufficient to uphold the jury's verdict.
Similarly, in Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit carefully examined the full record of the
bench trial in upholding the vast majority of the trial court's findings of fact as
justified by the record generated at trial.
In the seminal Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.
decision, the Court explored when summary judgment was appropriate in a
mammoth antitrust case that alleged a long-running conspiracy among the entire
Japanese electronics industry to price high in Japan and low in the United States in
order to drive U.S. competitors out of business.' 9 As part of a trilogy of cases
20
setting forth the meaning of summary judgment generally in civil litigation,
15 This overall agenda is one of the core insights of Professors Gavil and First. Gavil & First,
supra note 4, at 653-55, 697-72 1.
16472 U.S. 585, 585 (1985). See generally Symposium, Aspen Skiing 20 Years Later, 73
ANTITRUST L.J. 59 (2005).
7
Aspen, 472 U.S. at 598.
8

1Id. at 603-04, 606-11.

19475 U.S. 574, 576-79 (1986).
20

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,247-52 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
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Matsushita held that in the absence of direct evidence creating a genuine issue of
material fact as to the existence of an actionable conspiracy, a plaintiff could not
defeat summary judgment in a Section 1 case without some theory that made
economic sense. 2' The Court would not give every plaintiff her day in court for a
trial in the absence of direct evidence of conspiracy or reasonable circumstantial
evidence or inference that it was more likely than not that the defendants had acted
together rather than unilaterally in setting low prices in the United States.2 2
The procedural setting similarly was critical to the Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services, Inc. case.2 The Court held that, while the defendants
had a plausible theory why they did not, and could not, possess sufficient market
power to engage in unlawful tying, there was nonetheless record evidence that they
did exercise such power.24 This required the denial of summary judgment and a
trial on the merits.
Most remarkably, Trinko is neither a review of a trial record nor even a
summary judgment case. It is a reversal of the denial of a motion to dismiss for
failure to plead a cause of action for which relief can be granted. In this setting, a
court may not look beyond the four corners of the complaint, and must take all
facts in the complaint as true, make all reasonable inferences in favor of the
pleader, and dismiss the complaint only if there is no articulable way under which
relief can be granted. From Conley v. Gibson25 in the 1950s, to the Leatherman v.
TarrantCounty Narcotics Intelligence and CoordinationUnit2 6 decision in 1993,
to its most recent pronouncements in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema,N. A. 27 in 2002, the
Supreme Court has chided lower courts and reversed the dismissal of complaints
for misconstruing the concept of notice pleadings and the requirements of Rules 8
and 12(b)(6) governing complaints under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Although the Court was entitled to take judicial notice of the results of the
prior regulatory proceedings, Trinko reached its result in spite of, not in accordance
with, the procedural posture of the case. As Professor Gavil noted in his own
excellent treatment of Trinko, the Court instead engaged in a far-reaching factual
inquiry of Verizon's operations and the impact of the proposed case on its business
freedom without the benefit of any record whatsoever and with substantial
disregard for the teachings of civil procedure. 28 If the combined result of Trinko
and Matsushitais to suggest that antitrust cases are different from other cases with
respect to motions to dismiss but the same with respect to everything else, that is a
477 U.S. 317, 322-26 (1986).
21475 U.S. at 585-87.
221d. at 583 & n.6, 586-88.
23504

U.S. 451, 455 (1992).

241d. at 465-66, 472-73, 477-78.
25355 U.S. 41 (1957).
26507 U.S. 163 (1993).
27534 U.S. 506 (2002).
28
Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary DistributionStrategies by DominantFirms: Striking a Better
Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 45 (2004).
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result for Congress to address and not for the Court to decide in passing.
The Microsoft court in contrast seems to take procedure quite seriously, even
when it appears to limit its discretion as to the outcome on the merits. The
appellate court had before it a full record of an extensive bench trial. The appellate
court was deferential to findings of fact when supported by the record, even when
the trial court may have reached conclusions that the appellate court would not
have reached under the same circumstances. 29 As a result, the vast majority of the
findings of liability were affirmed.
Microsoft was also quite harsh when the court believed that the trial court
erred in its procedures for conducting the remedy portion of the trial and in
connection with the trial judge's ex parte communications with journalists in the
course of the trial itself.30 Procedure appears to matter deeply to the D.C. Circuit in
reviewing this landmark proceeding and its own procedural posture was
impeccable and was exacting in insisting that the trial court comply with its
procedural obligations.
B. Non-Immune Immunity
The net result in Trinko is a form of immunity for incumbent local
telecommunications operators that is inconsistent with the statutory scheme set
forth by Congress. Congress sought to both authorize and promote competition in
the local telephone market in the 1996 Telecommunication Act. 3' Congress thus
created a series of new duties for incumbents and at the same time set forth an
antitrust savings clause that nothing in the regulatory scheme would affect the
application of the antitrust laws. 32 Accordingly, the Court was precluded from
holding that the defendant was immune from the antitrust laws because Congress
said the defendant was not.
The Court nevertheless reached the same result by holding that a defendant's
foot dragging can never constitute unlawful monopolization for violation of its
duties under the 1996 Telecommunications Act. 33 This is not merely a matter of
lack of standing, which was the theory of the concurrence authored by Justice
Stevens. 34 If the wrong plaintiff had sued, then perhaps a competitor or state or
federal government antitrust enforcers could bring a case. But if truly no one can
challenge these violations under the antitrust laws, then this is immunity by another
name. Perhaps there remains some room for the application of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act to the collusive actions of incumbent local operators to preclude
29
3

3

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
id. at 97-117.

'The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended
in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
32
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 405-07 (2004). The antitrust savings
clause 33is set forth in section 601(b)(l) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406-07.
34
See id. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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entry,35 but then the Court has construed statutory language and congressional
intent as precluding Section 2 liability, but not Section 1, an unprecedented result
under either regulatory or antitrust principles. Given that Trinko refers to the
regulatory scheme repeatedly as an explanation of why antitrust will not be added
to the mix, the Court can only be read as imposing immunity in the most circuitous
manner possible.
II. THROWING AWAY SECTION 2
36

Once the Trinko court concluded that no antitrust cause of action existed, the
Court was done. The holding was complete and a court inclined toward judicial
restraint would have just signed off. Instead, Trinko embarked on a discursive37
essay on why monopoly power is an essential ingredient to a market economy,
why the essential facilities doctrine has no application to the situation at hand (and
little viability in general), 38 and why courts are likely to do more harm than good in
the antitrust area. 39 These are all extraordinary propositions for any court, let alone
the Supreme Court, to assert. This section explores these three most important and
outrageous assertions in the dicta portion of Trinko.
A. Learning to Love Monopoly
The Trinko decision reframes the standard two-step test for unlawful
monopolization in the most extraordinary way. After the standard trope that
monopoly power alone is not a violation, Trinko states without any support:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging
of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element
of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly pricesat least for a short period-is what attracts "business acumen" in the first
place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic
growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of
unless it is accompanied by
monopoly power will not be found unlawful
40
conduct.
anticompetitive
of
an element
This is the first time that I am aware that any court, let alone the Supreme
Court, has chosen to characterize the possession and exercise of monopoly power
35

Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965
(2006), may be an example of such a reading of Trinko. Interestingly, Trinko is not even cited in that

opinion.
36

Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.

37

See id. at 407-08.

38

See id. at 410-1I.

39

See id. at 408, 414-15.
1d. at 407.

40
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as "an important element of the free-market system." This is rather the instantiation
of the unproven and unprovable Schumpeterian hypothesis that we are all better off
in a world of monopolists who rise to power and then topple in waves of creative
destruction.4'
Even if true, it is not clear what any of that ringing rhetoric has to do with the
facts in Trinko. Verizon was the inheritor of a regulated monopoly whose principal
innovations were many decades in the past, long protected by government
regulation, and being challenged for allegedly anticompetitive acts in order to cling
to its dominant position by impeding new entry authorized by statute.
If the point of antitrust law is to encourage the acquisition and retention of
long-term monopoly power, then we might as well abandon the entire enterprise of
the regulation of competition by law, or more broadly, the promotion of a
democratic market economy. It is one thing to say that we tolerate the existence of
monopoly power (if not illegally acquired) but scrutinize its exercise to determine
what kind of behavior is exclusionary and what is not. It is quite another to
worship at the alter of monopoly power.
We have come a long way from the days of United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America (Alcoa) in which monopoly power, while still necessary but not sufficient
for a violation, was described by Judge Hand as deadening initiative, depressing
energy, and constituting a narcotic. 42 From the debates that preceded the passage of
the Sherman Act until Trinko, one can search long and hard before one sees
anything close to this love affair with monopoly in either Congress or in the
majority, concurring, or dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court in Section 2
cases.
Such a discussion was utterly unnecessary in any event, but is likely to shape
the interpretation of Section 2 from the shadows in a way that is impossible to
reform through legislation or rebut through legal precedent or policy argument.
The Trinko Court's pronouncements on this score stand merely as a naked
assertion of a policy preference that has been rejected since the passage of the
antitrust laws themselves.
At one place, the Court appears to have put its cards on the table and alluded
to certain past precedents that appear to support the plaintiff's refusal to deal
and/or essential facilities theory. However, the Court dismissed these venerable
precedents as involving: "concerted action, which presents greater anticompetitive
concerns and is amenable to a remedy that does not require judicial estimation of
free-market forces: simply requiring that the outsider be granted nondiscriminatory
admission to the club. 43
41See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMocRAcY

81-86 (2d ed. 1947).

42148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945). Alcoa was the work of the Second Circuit writing as the

court of final appeal because of a lack of quorum at the Supreme Court for the case.
43
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410 n.3. Here the Court cited United States v. TerminalRailroadAss 'n
of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), and Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I (1945), but not
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), the Supreme Court case most
applicable to the merits of the Trinko dispute.
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Privileging section 1 of the Sherman Act ("Section 1") over Section 2, or
believing concerted action is inherently more anticompetitive than equivalent
action by a single entity with similar power, is an equally astonishing assertion
with no textual support in the antitrust laws. Both halves of the Sherman Act have
equal prohibitions, equal penalties, and equal significance. If one is also inclined to
look at legislative history, there is simply no indication that the drafters of the
Sherman Act differentiated between these two concepts, or indeed particularly
understood that there was a difference.
Even if one were to take an exclusively economic view of antitrust, it is by no
means clear why the opposite view should not prevail. One can equally
persuasively argue from economic theory that antitrust principally fears durable
market power unaccompanied by substantial efficiencies that is more likely to arise
from a single rent-seeking monopolist than from a fragile agreement of competitors
seeking to imperfectly duplicate the behavior of a true monopolist in restricting
output and raising price.
B. Missing the Essential
Once the Court was done praising monopoly power and diminishing the
importance of Section 2, it turned to an equally unnecessary, and inherently wrong,
discussion of the essential facilities doctrine, which the plaintiffs had urged as an
alternate theory of liability. Here the court stated in its entirety:
This conclusion would be unchanged even if we considered to be
established law the "essential facilities" doctrine crafted by some lower
courts, under which the Court of Appeals concluded respondent's
allegations might state a claim. We have never recognized such a
doctrine, and we find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it
here. It suffices for present purposes to note that the indispensable
requirement for invoking the doctrine is the unavailability of access to
the "essential facilities"; where access exists, the doctrine serves no
purpose. Thus, it is said that "essential facility claims should ... be
denied where a state or federal agency has effective power to compel
sharing and to regulate its scope and terms." Respondent believes that
the existence of sharing duties under the 1996 Act supports its case. We
think the opposite: The 1996 Act's extensive provision for access makes
it unnecessary to impose a judicial doctrine of forced access. To the
extent respondent's "essential facilities" argument is distinct from its
general § 2 argument, we reject it. 44
If anything, the Court has it backwards. As I will be exploring in future work,
the essential facilities doctrine works best as a theory of monopolization when
"Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410-11 (citations omitted).
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dealing with infrastructure, in the sense that the facility in question is an input
which creates such substantial positive externalities downstream that a regime of
open access is socially desirable.45 As my colleague Brett Frischmann has noted,
this can include traditional commercial infrastructure such as bridges, roads, ports,
etc., but also other foundational resources such as lakes, ideas, and the Internet. 46 If
the firm controlling the essential infrastructure is not a competitor to those seeking
have been imposed since common law times under
access, certain duties to deal
• 47
the common carrier doctrine. If the firm controlling the essential infrastructure is
a competitor of those seeking access and uses that control to maintain its
dominance, then, and only then, does the essential facility doctrine come into play
as an antitrust concept.
Most antitrust cases with any merit that have invoked the essential facilities
doctrine have dealt with some aspect of infrastructure. These include the cases
dismissed by Trinko as partaking on Section 1 principles rather than Section 2.
However, the only bridge across the Mississippi, 48 the network of newspapers
comprising the Associated Press around the time of World War I,49 the local
phone loop controlled by MCI (and Verizon),7 the transmission lines controlled by
Otter Tail Power, 51 and under extraordinary circumstances intellectual property
rights,52 all nicely fall into this notion of infrastructure in both the technical sense
used by Professor Frischmann and in the colloquial everyday sense of the word.
Interestingly enough, it is Aspen (not Trinko) that is the hardest to justify in these
terms.53
The vast majority of infrastructural assets for which open access would be
societally valuable are neither wholly regulated (presumably immune under the
45

See Brett M. Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Essential Facilities, Infrastructure and

Open Access, availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=942074. For a more
complete discussion of infrastructure theory in these terms, see Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic
Theory of Infrastructureand Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 959-69 (2005), and
Lessig, Reply, Re-Marking the Progressin Frischmann,89 MINN. L. REV. 1031 (2005).
Lawrence
46
Frischmann, supra note 45, at 960.
47
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
WITH THE COMMON GOOD 279-318 (1998). If the owner of the facility is not a competitor of the
entity seeking access, no antitrust liability has been imposed for the denial of access regardless of
whether the facility is essential. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR ASs'N, 2002 ANNUAL
REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 278 (5th ed. 2003) (collecting cases).
48See Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. at 391-95.
49
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1945).
50
MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1094-98, 1140-41 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied,
464 U.S. 891 (1983); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,402-05 (2004).
51
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368 (1973).
52
Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. v. NDC Health GmbH & Co., 2004 E.C.R. I5039,
28-30, 38, 52,4 C.M.L.R. 28 (2004); Case C-241/91, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm'n,
1995 E.C.R.
1-743, U 1-2, 4 C.M.L.R. 28 (2004).
53
It is also additional support for Professor Fox's conclusion in a recent article that Trinko is a
much easier and better case to impose Section 2 liability than Aspen itself. See Eleanor M. Fox, Is
There Life in Aspen after Trinko? The Silent Revolution of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 73
ANTITRUST L.J. 153 (2005).
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regulatory statute in question) nor fully deregulated (for which Trinko may concede
some application of the essential facility for discriminatory denials by a competing
monopolist). Moreover, it is hard to find any truly unregulated facility that is
"essential" in the sense required by MCI and its progeny. Even the handful
of cases
treating sports stadiums as essential facilities may be better explained by virtue of
the heavy public subsidization of such facilities making them impossible to
duplicate with purely private resources.54 As a result, courts have dismissed
without much ado most essential facilities cases of the purely unregulated
unsubsidized type because the plaintiff could create their own alternative facility to
5
compete with the dominant firm' s.
Most of the good essential facility cases occur in the twilight zone of partial
regulation, which Trinko appears to have cast into the legal abyss. Take MCI
Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co.,56 which is generally credited as the source of
the modem version of the doctrine. 5 7 In MCI, the defendant AT&T continued as
the regulated monopolist of local telephone service but confronted competition in
the long distance market.58 AT&T denied MCI access to the local telephone system
which was necessary to complete long distance calls over MCI's microwave
network.5 9 MCI was physically, legally, and practically prevented from building its
own local telephone system. AT&T claimed it could not interconnect with MCI
because of existing regulatory restrictions and also because of technological and
system integrity concerns. 6 1 The Court found all of these purported justifications to
be legally or factually insufficient, and frequently pretextual, and imposed Section
2 liability in substantial part on this ground.6 2 Most of the verdicts imposing
liability under this theory have similarly concerned dominant firms resisting
deregulation or misusing partial deregulation in a way that the Microsoft court
would probably characterize as unlawful monopoly maintenance, but Trinko
appears to consider good, clean fun.
The European Union has in fact done a better job than we have in recognizing
54

HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION

55Twin

247 (2006).

Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1990); McKenzie

v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 370 (10th Cir. 1988); Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. v.
Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co., 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791, IT 43-47, 4
C.M.L.R. 112 (1999).

56708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
57
See generally Spencer Weber Waller, The "New" Law of Monopolization:An Examination
of MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 32 DEPAUL L. REV. 595

(1983).

58708 F.2d at 1093.
9
'6 1d. at 1096, 1131-32.

°Id. at 1132-33.

61

ld. at 1133-35.
1£d. at 1133, 1136, 1141. The court also affirmed liability
based on the sham litigation
doctrine, id. at 1128, 1157-58, but reversed portions of the judgment based on predatory pricing
62

claims, and remanded for a new trial on damages based solely on that conduct found to be unlawful,

id. at 1167-68. The case subsequently settled for a fraction of the original verdict.
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this fundamental distinction without citing infrastructure theory by name. In the
easy cases, the European Commission and European courts have imposed liability
(often using the essential facilities doctrine by name) when the operator of a port or
harbor uses its control of that facility to discriminate against a competitor for ferry
or shipping services by denying access to needed berths.63 The European court
quite properly refused to require the leading newspaper in Austria to make its
delivery network available to a smaller competitor that was, legally and practically
speaking, free to create its own network. 64 In the harder cases involving overly
broad intellectual property rights, the court left open the possibility of liability in
extraordinary circumstances.65 Here too, all the cases with any merit appear to fall
into the zone of partial regulation that Trinko, if translated into holding and
precedent, would eliminate.
Even if taken on its terms, Trinko's own discussion of the essential facilities
doctrine does not lead to the result it claims. Trinko states that "essential facility
claims should.., be denied where a state or federal agency has effective power to
compel sharing and to regulate its scope and terms. ' 66 The discussion that follows
hardly suggests that there was effective regulation in this particular case. For its
actions, Verizon was subject to fines totaling $13 million and various reporting
obligations. There was (and could not be at this early procedural stage of the case)
no discussion of whether this was "effective" in forcing Verizon to live up to its
obligations under state and federal telecommunications law. There is every
indication that it was not and that Verizon was prepared to incur litigation
expenses far in excess of this fine to avoid the one set of penalties that actually
would be effective in mandating nondiscriminatory access.
Let's turn the question on its head for a moment. Putting aside antitrust, do
Justice Scalia and the rest of the Trinko majority actually think that FCC regulation
implementing the 1996 Telecommunications Act is "effective" in any normal sense
of the word? Neither Congress nor most commentators think that it is. There is
certainly nothing in the numerous past opinions of the Supreme Court on recent
telecommunications issues that shows a great deal of faith in the 1996 Telecom
Act, FCC regulation, or even regulation in general.
C. Fearand Loathing of Antitrust and Courts
Trinko is replete with contempt for the judicial process adding any value in the
area of the regulation of competition by law. We are cautioned about the
63

See generally JAMES R. ATWOOD II, KINGMAN BREWSTER & SPENCER WEBER WALLER,

ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 16.4 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2005).
64Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag
GmbH65& Co., 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791, In 43-47,4 C.M.L.R. I t2 (1999).
Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. v. NDC Health GmbH & Co., 2004 E.C.R. I35-37, 4 C.M.L.R. 28 (2004).
5039,
66
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004) (citing PHILLIP AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 150, T 773e (Supp. 2003)).
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possibilities of false positives and urged to be reluctant to bring out the antitrust
battering ram unless one is confident that the benefits exceed the costs. This is
certainly debatable in principle but also curious because it appears to have little to
do with Trinko. The possibility of a false positive is quite low, since no one can
seem to find any procompetitive upside in Trinko's foot dragging and interference
with competitor access to its local exchange facilities.67
Moreover, there is no reason to think that deciding Trinko on the merits is
beyond the capacity of the average federal judge. No complex pricing issues were
at stake. The basic question of whether Verizon was or was not providing access
to its competitors on terms less favorable than it did its own local customers is a
straightforward question of discrimination amounting roughly to: Is X being treated
less favorably than Y? This is a basic binary type of verdict that federal and state
courts decide on a daily basis in both statutory and common law cases of civil
rights, employment discrimination, common carrier duties, licensing decisions,
school segregation, prison conditions, access to health care, and numerous other
areas of the law. These are a-dime-a-dozen type of decisions that are a far cry from
the polycentric multi-variate balancing type of cases that legal theory predicts
courts are comparatively poorer at deciding. 68 If one concludes the courts cannot
handle this kind of dispute, then most of the federal docket should be discarded in
favor of some other institutional dispute resolution mechanism.
The courts have proved themselves quite adept at making these sorts of
decisions in right-to-access antitrust cases, whether called essential facilities cases
or not. The Trinko court acknowledged that the courts have adequately handled
such disputes under the rubric of Section 1.69 When the essential facilities doctrine
has been explicitly used by the lower courts, they have been equally adept at
sorting out the meritorious cases from the frivolous cases where a competitor could
reasonably duplicate the facility in question but simply preferred not to go to the
trouble and expense. 70 What Trinko did is hold that, in most circumstances, federal
courts will never even get the chance to do what they have been doing quite well
for decades because of a theoretical concern for false positives in the context of a
case that did not even raise a credible fear of such an outcome.
Trinko further instructs us to be wary of adjudicating liability where the courts
cannot implement an adequate remedy. This is a fair concern, but again the courts
have proved up to the challenge. It is also not clear whether Trinko itself raised any
serious concern in this regard, and certainly not in its request for damages.
Right to access cases and essential facility cases come in all shapes and sizes as
67

See Fox, supra note 53, at 165-66.
facility cases may actually be easier to adjudicate than the full rule-of-reason type
analysis adopted in Microsoft, particularly those cases that reach the final stage requiring an actual
68Essential

balancing of pro and anticompetitive effects.
69540 U.S. at 410 n.3.
70
See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text. For example, MCI distinguished between
access to intra- and inter-city networks in which MCI was free to build its own facilities and was not
given access to AT&T's existing competitive facilities. 708 F.2d 1081, 1147-50 (7th Cir. 1983).
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do the possible remedies when a violation has been shown. Many of the cases
involve nothing more than the award (or the review on appeal) of treble damages.
That was the case in Aspen, where the Court affirmed a judgment for treble
damages, 7' and MCI, where the court affirmed on liability, but reversed and
remanded for a new trial on damages.72
Even the Trinko Court appears to have no problem with a straightforward
73
injunction (at least in the Section 1 context) of "Thou shall not discriminate., It is
not clear why a similar remedy in a Section 2 case is any more problematic. The
complaint in Trinko requested both treble damages and injunctive relief to restore
equal access. 7 4 This is the bread and butter of the federal courts. Imagine the outcry
if Trinko's logic were imported to justify abstention by the federal courts from
adjudicating racial or employment discrimination cases because of a fear of false
positives and a need to defer to other enforcement regimes.
One can imagine where problems at the remedy stage in antitrust or other
kinds of cases are so massive that a court might be reluctant to adjudicate liability,
but it is by no means clear that it has a right to refrain from doing so. In such a
worst-case scenario, the court could issue a declaratory judgment or a decision on
liability and leave the decision as to remedy for another day.75
Creative solutions are also available. Professor Philip Weiser has been a
pioneer in suggesting a role for state and federal regulators as special masters when
implementation of a judicial decree involves day-to-day supervision, complicated
pricing decisions, and technical skill beyond the capacities of a generalist federal
court.7 6 If regulatory agencies are so good at promoting the competitive aims of the
Telecommunications Act, as is the view in Trinko, why not enlist them at the back
end of the process as well? The Court obviously prefers to walk away from such
situations entirely, but in doing so could have benefited from more creative
approachs, alternative dispute resolution procedures, or the innovative techniques
used in the final settlement of Microsoft that created a private monitoring structure
to implement a settlement far more regulatory in nature than the relief sought by
the Trinko plaintiffs.
D. Legal Process Lessons from Trinko and Microsoft
A variety of important lessons can be drawn from comparing Microsoft and
Trinko. First, Judge Posner may indeed be correct that there are few, if any,
71

Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 587 (1985).

72

MC1, 708 F.2d at 1167-68.

7'540 U.S. at 410 n.3.
74

1d. at 405.
75

This is precisely what the Second Circuit did in Alcoa. United States v. Aluminum Co. of
F.2d 416, 445-48 (2d Cir. 1945).
Am., 148
76
Philip J. Weiser, Goldwasser, the Telecom Act, and Reflections on Antitrust Remedies, 55
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 16 (2003); Philip J. Weiser, The Relationship of Antitrust and Regulation in a
DeregulatoryEra, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 549, 558-59 (2005).
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remaining differences between the Chicago School and the so-called Harvard
School of antitrust. 77 Trinko has many of the hallmarks of a strong Chicago School
opinion: strong use of theory, dislike of collusion, embrace of market power as a
sign of efficient success in the best interests of society, and overall fear of false
antitrust positives that would stifle market outcomes allegedly favorable to
consumer welfare.
The only scholarly support cited in the opinion is the work of Phillip Areeda
and Herbert Hovenkamp.78 Professor Areeda is considered by most the founding
father of the Harvard School, and Professor Hovenkamp is the current editor and
author of the monumental antitrust treatise begun by Areeda and his colleague Don
Turner at Harvard. Part of the Trinko majority included Justice Breyer, a former
antitrust and regulated industries professor from Harvard Law School, before his
appointment to the federal bench. Justice Breyer is not known as a shy or easily
intimidated jurist and presumably would not have joined the opinion if he wished
to approach the matter some other way. Indeed, it would have been surprising if he
had done so, since Trinko is virtually the living embodiment of Justice Breyer's
79
own opinion from the First Circuit in Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co.
Nor does there appear to be a strong competing voice on the Supreme Court
for Section 2 issues. In Trinko, the concurrence was couched in terms of standing
rather than liability, so we do not know whether Justices Stevens, Thomas, and
Souter would have had anything substantially different to say if they had reached
the issues discussed in the main opinion.
The key differences between Microsoft and Trinko do not appear to stem from
basic political or philosophical differences. There are no substantial political or
philosophical differences between the makeup of the current D.C. Circuit and the
Supreme Court. The Chief Judge of the Circuit (and probable author or main
contributor to the opinion), Douglas Ginsburg, may be a product of the Harvard
Law School faculty, but graduated from the University of Chicago Law School,
was head of the Antitrust Division during the Reagan Administration, and serves
on the board of the Law and Economics Center at George Mason University Law
School, a school with strong philosophical ties to the Chicago school.
Nor do the two opinions differ much in philosophy. Both are anxious to avoid
false positives. Both provide defendants with safe harbors of different sorts in
defending against Section 2 litigation. Trinko's safety zone for defendants is
grounded in the presence of effective regulation that limits the additional utility of
77

Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 925
(1979). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW ix (2d ed. 2001 ) (discussing degree of

consensus in antitrust analysis). Cf HOVENKAMP, supra note 54, at 2, 35-38 (2005) (citing
agreement
on general principles but not specific rules for antitrust enforcement).
78
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410-11, 415 (citing PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP,

ANTITRUST LAW 12, 1 240c3 (2d ed. 2000); PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW 150, T 773e (Supp. 2003); Phillip Areeda, EssentialFacilities:An Epithet in Need ofLimiting
Principles,58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 853 (1989)).
71915 F.2d 17 (1lst Cir. 1990).

HeinOnline -- 2006 Utah L. Rev. 756 2006

No. 3]

A TALE OF TWO COURTS

antitrust remedies. This could well be right as a philosophical construct, but does
not seem to have much to do with the factual setting for Trinko or its procedural
posture.
Microsoft's safety zone for defendants lies in a burden of proof for plaintiffs to
show some likely harm to competition as well as the opportunity for the defendant
to show that there is a competing efficiency justification that has some basis in
both law and fact. Then the plaintiff has the further hill to climb of showing that
the harm to competition outweighs the asserted justifications. With all but a few
exceptions, Microsoft flunked the second step and was unable to articulate at trial
any cognizable procompetitive justifications for most of its conduct. This is hardly
a radical pro-plaintiff approach, although the plaintiffs ultimately prevailed on
most aspects of liability.
The legal process school from the middle of the twentieth century taught us
that how an opinion is written is important. While infrequently applied to antitrust
matters, 80 this school of judging, pioneered by Professors Hart and Sacks,
contended that the most important thing about a judicial decision was the process
of reasoned elaboration so that the basic tenets of the decision were honestly and
thoughtfully laid out for public display and available for application in future cases
that would almost never be identical.8 ' Successful opinions earn the respect of the
parties, commentators, future litigants, and the lower courts that have to apply the
utterances of the Supreme Court in messy factual and legal situations that were not
fully adjudicated in the prior case. Unsuccessful opinions become subject to debate
and criticism among commentators and a process of guerilla warfare in the lower
courts that undermines their legitimacy
until they are eventually repudiated in an
"emperor has no clothes" moment. 82
Section 2 has never been a shining example of success from a legal process
point of view. Most of the old chestnuts are empty verbal formulations that do not
help courts decide hard cases or parties plan their conduct in the real world.8 3 Now
compare Microsoft and Trinko from this perspective. Which will stand the test of
time? Which will garner respect and support from both antitrust enforcers and
80

See Reynolds & Waller, supra note 6, at 1813-16.

8'See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey

eds., Foundation Press 1994) (tent. ed. 1958); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 33-43 (1995); Anthony J. Sebok, Reading the Legal

Process, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1580-81 (1996) (book review). Interestingly enough, Hart and
Sacks used as one of their primary examples an antitrust opinion by the Federal Trade Commission
in which they reprinted the actual opinion followed by a version they regarded from a legal process
view as
a more successful version of the same opinion. HART & SACKS, supra at 1084-95.
82
In the antitrust area, arguably the line of cases dealing with the standards for judging the
legality of vertical restraints from White Motors Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), through
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), and then ContinentalT. V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), can be characterized as an illustration of this aspect of the
legal process
argument.
83
Reynolds & Waller, supra note 6, at 1823-27.
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defenders and the institutions that apply the law? Which will grow in influence
until it comes to represent a settled and accepted approach to the law? Which will
be undermined by hostile commentators and rebellious lower courts until
discarded?
More speculatively, how would the D.C. Circuit have done if it had decided
the Trinko case? Would it have reached the merits? How much would the
procedural posture have mattered? Would it have discussed all the dicta raised in
Trinko itself?
How would the Microsoft test have been applied to the facts at issue
84
in Trinko?
The fact that Trinko is the product of the U.S. Supreme Court and that
Microsoft is the product of an intermediate appellate court gives Trinko an early
lead in the race for posterity, but is hardly determinative. Antitrust is replete with
federal appellate decisions that have come to reflect settled doctrine far more than
the Supreme Court decisions of similar vintage addressing the same topics. United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,85 Alcoa,86 and MCI 7 are all decisions that
have eclipsed their Supreme Court competition for coherent statements of the
antitrust doctrine of their time.
Trinko obviously will have its greatest impact on the group of cases involving
claims against incumbent local exchange companies and has had its intended effect
of virtually eliminating such claims. 88 Whatever happens beyond that specific
factual setting will depend on how broadly the case is read and applied to the
general body of monopolization law. Microsoft has the prestige of the D.C. Circuit,
the nearly unique situation of being a unanimous en banc, per curiam opinion
synthesizing an entire area of law in a massive and complex case, and a three-year
head start as assets in the horse race with Trinko. 89 A quick check of citations and
how the two cases are being used in subsequent litigation shows that, for the
moment, it is just too close to call.
IV.

CONCLUSION

One can gather that I do not think very much of the Supreme Court's opinion
84This kind of alternate history is common in science fiction and fantasy literature but not
unheard of in law. See generally WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE
NATION'S ToP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION passim (Jack
M. Balkin ed. 2002); WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S Top LEGAL EXPERTS

REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION passim (Jack M. Balkin ed. 2005).
8585 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
86United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
87
MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,464 U.S.

891 (1983).
88See, e.g., Covad Commc'ns Co. v. Bell At. Corp., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222-23 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(denying petition for rehearing).
89

Compare Microsoft with Brown v. Board of Education,347 U.S. 483 (1954) (per curiam), in

which the Supreme Court labored mightily to craft a unanimous opinion that would have the
greatest weight and prestige in the real world.
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in Trinko. While this is certainly true, it is not as a result of any strong
disagreement on the merits. The interplay between federal and state
telecommunications regulation and the antitrust laws is a complex one about which
reasonable people may differ.
However, there is much at stake when the Supreme Court or any court opines
on a subject. What the opinion chooses to address (or not) beyond the holding and
result tends to have great real-world consequences. Antitrust opinions matter
because they represent the legal philosophy of capitalism. They tend to stick
around for a while and are almost impossible to reverse by legislation. Section 2
opinions tend to matter more than most because they are so infrequent and so much
turns on them.
Trinko's main defect is its attempt to radically redefine the law of
monopolization while purporting to uphold established doctrine. It did far more
than it had to and did it badly. Justice Stevens's opinion on standing would have
sufficed, and in the alternative, the first few pages of the majority opinion would
have sufficed once it found greater certainty in the regulatory provisions of the
Telecommunications Act. What follows is an ode to laissez faire that is in stark
contrast to everything antitrust has stood for since its inception, regardless of one's
opinions about the validity of any particular theory or case. In contrast, Microsoft
did its job and it did pretty well, even if one believes, as Gavil and First do, that it
should have done more.
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